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Abstract—Secondary markets for spectrum trading have
been considered an important solution for generating spec-
trum opportunities in an environment where scarcity is the
rule. Nonetheless, an important factor when envisioning
a successful spectrum trading environment is to consider
how comparable an available frequency is to the frequency
an spectrum user prefers. With this aim, we consider the
fungibility scores previously determined in [1] in order
to explore further parameters that can influence this
quantification of the level of fungibility. Further, we merge
these fungibility calculations with an existing spectrum
trading model, SPECTRAD [2], seeking to determine the
actual impact of the limitations of spectrum fungibility in
the market viability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing communication needs and opportuni-
ties fueled by technology changes have resulted in
the reduced availability of electromagnetic spec-
trum. Countless solutions to use spectrum more
efficiently have been analyzed over time; among
them have been secondary markets for electromag-
netic spectrum. This solution was first mentioned by
Coase in [3] and has also been considered in more
recent work [4], [5], where secondary spectrum
markets are seen as a means to make a more efficient
use of this resource.
In an ideal spectrum trading scenario, electro-
magnetic spectrum would be considered an asset or
commodity like other traded commodities. In such
a world, we could deploy a spectrum trading system
in which, given the perfect fungibility characteris-
tics of spectrum, each seller would know that the
spectrum he offers would satisfy the demands of
every buyer and at the same time, each buyer would
be confident about the compatibility between the
spectrum market purchases and his specific needs.
Unfortunately, the physical characteristics of elec-
tromagnetic spectrum frequency are not consistent
with this scenario. In fact, electromagnetic spec-
trum is not fungible in space nor frequency. That
is, spectrum availability in one geographic region
cannot satisfy demands in another region and the
propagation of electromagnetic waves is a function
of frequency, which means that one band is not nec-
essarily fungible with another band. The limitations
of spectrum fungibility was first examined in [1].
In this paper, a fungibility score was proposed as a
means to establish a level of substitutability of two
different frequencies.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of the
parameters that would influence spectrum fungi-
bility and consider their impact on the liquidity
of (hypothetical) spectrum trading markets. We do
this by refining the calculation of these fungibility
scores, applying them to particular spectrum bands
and using them as an input to simulated spectrum
trading markets using Caicedo’s SPECTRAD model
[6] to determine the impact of fungibility on the
viability of spectrum markets. In order to quantify
the impact of the limitations in spectrum fungibility,
we consider as a reference point the market viability
results obtained in [6], which model the market
characteristics and conditions for viability when
considering a perfectly fungible electromagnetic
spectrum.
This paper is structured as follows: section II
presents the approach to calculating fungibility
scores. Section III explains how the spectrum trad-
ing market has been modeled and the considerations
2made in order to incorporate non-perfect fungibility
conditions. Section IV presents the market viability
results under non-perfect fungibility conditions and
further compares them to those obtained in [6].
Section V contains our conclusions and specifies
research directions that will be considered in the
future.
II. FUNGIBILITY SCORES
An evident first step for determining the impact
of the limitations in spectrum fungibility in a spec-
trum trading scenario is to develop a quantitative
measure of a rather abstract notion, i.e., non-perfect
fungibility. The use of fungibility scores have been
proposed to achieve this [1], which could quantify
the level of comparability between two frequencies
(e.g., the preferred and available frequency bands).
The authors of that paper considered the free-space
propagation loss differences across electromagnetic
frequencies to determine how substitutable a cer-
tain frequency band is with another. Their results
represent the level of comparability of the different
preferred frequencies and available spectrum op-
tions in the form of both a “distance” score and
a “probabilistic” score. This leaves the spectrum
buyer or requester with a measure to consider how
applicable is a given frequency to his actual needs,
and hopefully would make it easier to decide which
frequency to opt for.
Free-space path loss sets an explicit difference in
the characteristics and capabilities of various fre-
quency bands. However, most actual transmissions
and communications take place in geographic en-
vironments with characteristics very different from
free-space. Additionally, infrastructure characteris-
tics (such as antenna height) play an important role
in the propagation conditions. It is for these reasons
that we have delved deeper into the propagation loss
analysis and considered alternate propagation mod-
els for calculating fungibility scores, considering,
in particular, the empirical propagation loss models
such as Okumura-Hata, Cost 231-Hata and Walfish
Ikegami.
When using these models for determining fungi-
bility scores, we can analyze the multi-dimensional
characteristics of spectrum, and further articulate
which are the modifications that a spectrum buyer,
with a preferred frequency, would have to make to
their current system in order to satisfy their traffic
requirements with an alternate frequency. These
modifications could include factors such as the dis-
tance from the base station, the base station antenna
height, and the mobile antenna height. The most
interesting part however, is how these modifications
and propagation loss considerations result in per-
haps more quantifiable conditions such as coverage
and capacity. Thus, we can now shed more light
onto the question of how opting for a new frequency
affects the maximum capacity and coverage that can
be achieved. More importantly, we can determine
which specific change (i.e., increase/decrease of
bandwidth, distance from the base station) that a
spectrum user can consider in order to achieve
appropriate (not to say equal) characteristics with
an alternate, available frequency.
In this work, we will focus on the calculation of
fungibility scores based on coverage and capacity
considerations. For presenting these scores, we re-
fine the approach used in [1]. We determine proba-
bilistic and distance fungibility scores by comparing
the results obtained with a reference frequency f1 to
those obtained with a frequency f2. The probabilistic
score, as shown in (1), corresponds to the ratio
of the results obtained with f1 and f2, and the
distance score, as shown in (2), corresponds to
the Euclidean distance between the results obtained
with the two different frequencies. Note that the
ideal probabilistic score is 1, and the ideal distance
score is 0. Both of these conditions imply that the
two considered frequencies are perfectly fungible.
Pscore = min(
f1
f2
, 1) (1)
Dscore =
max((d1 − d2), 0)
d1
(2)
A. Coverage Fungibility Score
An important reason for spectrum users to seek
further spectrum assets, besides fulfilling their traffic
requirements, is to increase their coverage area.
This would thus be a reason for them to enter
the spectrum trading market and opt for additional
spectrum bandwidth units. If we take into account
the value of the minimum required received power,
we can determine the maximum distance that we
could cover. This maximum distance corresponds
to the maximum cell radius and gives us a notion
of the coverage radius that can be achieved with
3a given frequency. The received power can be esti-
mated through equation (3), where Pt is the transmit
power, the transmitting and receiving antennae gains
are Gt and Gr respectively, and Lp accounts for
the path loss. Since we are working with a specific
minimum required received power, we utilize (3)
to determine the corresponding maximum allowable
path loss. Finally, through the empirical path loss
models that we have utilized, we can determine the
maximum distance associated with this path loss
requirement, and thus, we will obtain the maximum
cell radius or coverage radius.
In this manner, we compare the maximum cell
radius for determining the coverage fungibility score
for f1 and that for f2, given a common, minimum
received power requirement. For the calculations
presented here, we consider a transmitting power
Pt equal to 1mW and the transmitting and receiving
antennae gains are set to 1. The minimum allowable
received power is set to -80 dBm.
Pr = Pt(dBm)+Gt(dB)+Gr(dB)−Lp(dB) (3)
B. Capacity Fungibility Score
In addition to coverage, users may trade spectrum
to increase their capacity in a given coverage area.
In this case, the Shannon capacity formula (4)
was applied to two different circumstances: when
capacity is considered at a fixed distance from the
transmitter, and when capacity is evaluated at the
cell edge of the reference frequency.
C = B log2(1 + SNR) (4)
Capacity at a fixed distance: In this scenario,
we consider the power received at a given reference
distance for the SNR calculations (i.e., 1 Km) using
equation (3). The noise is estimated using the noise
temperature floor formula (5), or its equivalent in
dB (6), where F is the noise figure of the receiver,
k is the Boltzmann’s constant, T is the reference
temperature (290 K) and B is the considered band-
width.
The reference value for this fungibility score will
be the capacity achieved with a given frequency
at the reference distance with a specific bandwidth
(i.e., capacity achieved by 700 MHz at 1 Km with
1 MHz of bandwidth). The compared value will be
the capacity achieved at the same reference distance
with different frequencies and varying bandwidths.
The point at which the probabilistic score reaches 1
or the distance score reaches 0, signals the amount
of bandwidth of f2 required to equal the perfor-
mance of f1.
N = FkTB (5)
= F (dB) + k(dBm/Hz/K) + T (dBm) +B(dBm)
(6)
Capacity at the cell edge: In this scenario,
we consider the maximum cell radius at which a
reference frequency complies with the minimum
received power requirements. In other words, the
reference will be the capacity achieved with a
certain frequency at its cell edge with a reference
bandwidth. For the compared frequency, we calcu-
late the capacity achieved at the distance equivalent
to the cell edge of the reference frequency (not its
own cell edge) with different values of bandwidth
and the corresponding noise. Again, if we compare
the capacities achieved with f1 and f2, through
their ratio or the Euclidean distance separating them,
we obtain a new capacity fungibility score. The
interpretation of the score is the same as that of
the capacity at a fixed distance scenario: the score
corresponds to the required bandwidth of f2 to
match the capacity of f1, but this time at the cell
edge of the reference frequency.
C. Fungibility Score Results
The tables presented in what follows show the
fungibility scores that we have obtained when ap-
plying the methods explained above. Table I shows
the parameters that he have considered as a ref-
erence throughout our calculations and their cor-
responding values. We have chosen these values
according to those specified in [2] in our aim to
merge this results with the spectrum trading envi-
ronment presented in that same work. As it can
be observed, in this particular analysis we have a
set of preferred frequencies which correspond to
the reference frequencies and we consider only one
available frequency, which in turn corresponds to
the compared frequency.
Table II contains the coverage fungibility scores
that we have obtained taking into account the fore-
going reference and compared parameters. To com-
plement these results, figure 1 portrays the coverage
fungibility scores of the preferred frequencies when
compared to frequencies ranging from 700 MHz to
2000 MHz.
4As it can be observed in Table II, the dis-
tance scores are complementary to the probabilistic
scores, which is the reason why we have included
only one of the two scores in this and the upcoming
figures.
Reference Parameters
Parameter Reference Value
Preferred Frequencies 700, 1000, 1500, 1700,1900 and 2000 MHz
Available Frequency 1900 MHz
Bandwidth 200 KHz
Distance 1 Km
Transmitted Power 1mW
Minimum Allowable
Received Power - 80 dBm
Base Station Height 50 m
Geographic Environment Medium/Small city
Mobile Antenna Height 1 m
Noise Figure 0 dB
Width of road 20 m
Buildings separation 40 m
Buildings height 15 m
Phi 90
TABLE I
REFERENCE PARAMETERS UTILIZED FOR THE CALCULATION OF
FUNGIBILITY SCORES
Following the coverage-based results, we present
our capacity fungibility scores at 1 Km (fixed dis-
tance) in Table III. The scores in this table quantify
the level of comparability of 1900 MHz with differ-
ent values of bandwidth to the preferred frequency
operating with 200 KHz of bandwidth. It is in this
manner that the bandwidth value corresponding to
a distance/probabilistic score of 0/1 respectively,
indicates that with that bandwidth the available fre-
quency can match the performance of the preferred
frequency. In this scenario, we show that 1900 MHz
with 20 MHz of bandwidth would not reach the
perfect fungibility status when compared to 700
MHz, while when compared to 2000 MHz, the
Coverage Fungibility Scores
Preferred
Frequency
[MHz]
Distance
Score
Probabilistic
Score
700 0.5766 0.4234
1000 0.4368 0.5632
1500 0.2000 0.8000
1700 0.1040 0.8960
1900 0 1
2000 0 1
TABLE II
COVERAGE FUNGIBILITY SCORES. THE PREFERRED
FREQUENCIES ARE COMPARED TO AN AVAILABLE CENTER
FREQUENCY OF 1900 MHZ
reference bandwidth will suffice. Figure 2 supports
the results presented in Table III and shows the
capacity probabilistic scores for values of bandwidth
in the range of 200 KHz to 20 MHz.
Capacity Fungibility Score - At 1Km
Preferred
Frequency
[MHz]
Bandwidth
(Available
Frequency)
[MHz]
Distance
Score
Probabilistic
Score
700
0.2 0.6552 0.3448
1 0.3856 0.6144
20 0.1968 0.8032
1000
0.2 0.5649 0.4351
1 0.2246 0.7754
11.22 0 1
1500 0.2 0.3085 0.69150.483 0 1
1700 0.2 0.1686 0.83140.3 1 1
1900 0.2 0 1
2000 0.2 0 1
TABLE III
RESULTING CAPACITY FUNGIBILITY SCORES AT 1 KM DISTANCE
FROM THE TRANSMITTER. THE PREFERRED FREQUENCIES
OPERATE AT 200 KHZ OF BANDWIDTH AND ARE COMPARED TO
AN AVAILABLE FREQUENCY OF 1900 MHZ.
Table IV includes the resulting capacity fungibil-
ity scores when analyzing the cell edge of the refer-
ence or preferred frequencies. In the same manner
as the previous scenario, the preferred frequencies
are operating at 200 KHz of bandwidth and will be
5Fig. 1: Coverage Distance Score for the preferred frequencies when compared to frequencies in the 700 - 2000 MHz range
Fig. 2: Capacity probabilistic score comparing the preferred frequencies to 1900 MHz at 1 Km to portray the fixed distance
scenario
compared at their cell edge with the performance
of 1900 MHz with different values of bandwidth.
Figure 3 complements the results presented in Table
IV for additional values of bandwidth. From these
results we can point out that at the cell edge of
the reference frequency, the available frequency
will require less bandwidth for achieving perfect
fungibility scores. In fact, the required bandwidth
is fairly close to the reference value.
III. SPECTRUM TRADING
After calculating fungibility scores, the next step
is to incorporate this notion of non-perfect fungibil-
ity into the spectrum market model and determine
the effect they have in the resulting market viability
and liquidity. For this purpose, we use the spectrum
market modeling tool SPECTRAD, presented in [6].
This tool models a secondary spectrum market in
which spectrum users take part in continuous double
6Fig. 3: Capacity probabilistic score comparing the preferred frequencies with 1900 MHz at the cell edge of the preferred
frequencies.
Capacity Fungibility Score - Cell Edge
Preferred
Frequency
[MHz]
Bandwidth
(Available
Frequency)
[MHz]
Distance
Score
Probabilistic
Score
700 0.2 0.3454 0.65460.333 0 1
1000 0.2 0.2316 0.76840.272 0 1
1500 0.2 0.0903 0.90970.223 0 1
1700 0.2 0.0434 0.95660.211 0 1
1900 0.2 0 1
2000 0.2 0 1
TABLE IV
CAPACITY FUNGIBILITY SCORE AT THE CELL EDGE OF THE
REFERENCE/PREFERRED FREQUENCIES WHEN COMPARED TO
1900 MHZ
auctions in order to acquire a lease or a license for
bandwidth units that are being offered in the market.
The market participants in a spectrum-trading sce-
nario are the Spectrum Exchange, Spectrum Users
and the Regulator. The spectrum users can be
thought of as users who hold spectrum and would
desire to sell it: Spectrum License Holders (SLH)
and also users who need to acquire bandwidth
units in order to fulfill their traffic requirements,
called Spectrum License Requestors (SLR). The
spectrum market can be modeled in various ways,
e.g., exchanges or brokers. Since our aim is to
present a first approach into incorporating fungibil-
ity scores to a spectrum trading market, we will
consider a spectrum exchange with Band Manager
functionality. Further, in our study, this exchange
will not act as a pooling point. According to [2],
additional characteristics of this type of exchange
are as follows:
• The trade-able spectrum is entirely held by the
exchange,
• The exchange is in charge of providing the
spectrum and this spectrum should return to
the exchange upon cease of the leasing or sale
agreement, and
• The exchange grants the corresponding autho-
rizations for use of the spectrum, but it is not
in charge of configuring any equipment for
spectrum use.
The market viability results obtained in [2] repre-
sent the outcome of a spectrum trading market when
spectrum is perfectly fungible. For this reason, we
would like to use these results as a reference point to
7determine the conditions that become “harmful” for
the market when considering non-perfect fungibility
characteristics. With this in mind, we incorporated
the fungibility criteria in the least intrusive manner
possible into the Band Manager Exchange market
modeled in SPECTRAD.
A. Model Characteristics
The characteristics of the model we have tested
are as follows:
Market Participants: The spectrum exchange, in
the form of a Band Manager (BM), holds a specific
number of 200 KHz bandwidth units of spectrum in
the 1900 MHz band. The BM will offer its available
assets for lease in each bid round and determine a
cutoff price for the spectrum based on the bids of the
spectrum buyers. At the end of the bidding rounds,
the BM will grant the spectrum to the users with
bids above the cutoff price.
The spectrum users will be limited to SLRs who
are seeking a lease or license transfer of spec-
trum from the BM. Note that the SLRs’ preferred
frequency is not the same frequency band offered
by the Band Manager; in this way, the SLRs will
post their bids according to their valuation of the
spectrum offered by the BM. Following [2], the
maximum price an SLR is willing to pay for spec-
trum corresponds to the price the same SLR would
pay for an AT unit. If at the end of the bidding
rounds, an SLR is not able to obtain bandwidth units
of spectrum, it will opt for alternate technology (AT)
units to satisfy its requirements. As specified in [2]
the AT units can be viewed as alternate equipment
the user can utilize instead of the spectrum offered
by the BM for fulfilling its traffic demands1. In this
work we have assumed that an AT unit will have
the same capabilities as the preferred frequency of
an SLR.
The Regulator will maintain records that map
bandwidth units of a frequency band to the current
holders of that spectrum. In addition, the regulator
has the responsibility of overseeing the legitimacy of
the transactions taking place in the market; however,
it will not take an active position in the market
unless anomalies would require its action.
1Alternate technologies might include wireline systems, invest-
ments to make the existing spectrum more efficient, the use of
unlicensed bands, etc.
User Valuation of Spectrum: One of the most
important considerations for deploying secondary
spectrum-trading markets is the goal of achieving
a more efficient use of spectrum, which includes
granting this resource to the users who value it the
most. This would imply a highly efficient spectrum
assignment method that considers market gains that
cannot be determined during the initial spectrum
assignment by the primary market [4]. When includ-
ing fungibility considerations in the market, recall
that users with a preferred center frequency f1 will
value an available spectrum bandwidth unit (BBU)
of frequency f2 on the basis that it can satisfy its
traffic and transmission requirements with it. In this
manner, an SLR will determine a maximum price
that it is willing to pay for the spectrum frequency,
f2, offered by the BM. The maximum price corre-
sponds to the price the SLR would pay for AT units,
which would also satisfy its requirements.
In the SPECTRAD model, the price of BBUs and
AT units are related by (7). From this expression,
we obtain the limit price that an SLR is willing to
pay for a BBU, as shown in (8).
(BBUnits)(LimitPricePerBBU) =
(ATUnits)(PricePerAT ) (7)
LimitPricePerBBU =
ATUnits
BBUnits
(PricePerAT ) (8)
In the case of perfect fungibility the number
of AT units would be the same as the number of
BBUs, thus showing that the maximum price per
BBU that a user would pay corresponds to the
same price the user would pay for an AT. When
considering our non-perfect fungibility scenario,
this outcome will no longer occur. Since BBUs
and AT units will provide different capacities, if
we consider (9) and (10), we can determine that
we will need different numbers of BBUs than we
would need AT units. Moreover we can relate the
two latter equations and obtain (11), which actually
corresponds to the capacity probabilistic fungibility
score we presented in the first part of this paper.
ATunits =
TrafficToServe
CapacityPerAT
(9)
BBUnits =
TrafficToServe
CapacityPerBBU
(10)
8ATUnits
BBUnits
=
CapacityPerBBU
CapacityPerAT
(11)
It is in this manner that we have introduced the
non-perfect fungibility considerations in the eco-
nomic valuation of spectrum from SLRs. To sum-
marize, the maximum price that a user would pay
for a bandwidth unit will now be limited by the ratio
between the capacity it can reach with the offered
bandwidth unit and the capacity it can reach with an
AT, which has been calculated to match the capacity
obtained when using the preferred frequency.
SPECTRAD considers three levels of user valu-
ation of spectrum: low, medium and high. Provided
the BM offers a center frequency of 1900 MHz and
based on the fungibility scores presented in the first
part of this paper, we will consider that the users
with a low valuation of spectrum have a preferred
frequency of 700 MHz, the users with a medium
valuation will have a preferred frequency of 1700
MHz and the users with a high spectrum valuations
will be those with a preferred frequency of 2000
MHz.
Relating the fungibility score to the monetary
valuation of spectrum, we determine that the low,
medium and high valuation users will have the
limit BBU prices given by (12), (13), and (14)
respectively.
LimitPricePerBBU = 0.3448 ∗ PricePerAT (12)
LimitPricePerBBU = 0.8314 ∗ PricePerAT (13)
LimitPricePerBBU = PricePerAT (14)
The price per AT has been determined following
[2]. Thus, the range of prices for an AT unit accord-
ing to the valuation level is defined through (15),
(16), and (17). The users will be assigned a random
value within this range according to their level of
AT valuation. For our non-perfect fungibility case,
we shall consider that SLRs’ spectrum valuation is
inversely proportional to their ATs’ valuation. For
instance, an SLR with a low spectrum valuation
will be assigned AT prices from the PricePerAThigh
valuation range. In these expressions, minATPrice
corresponds to the minimum price a user would
pay for an AT unit and is equal to 100 monetary
units; maxATPrice is the maximum price to pay for
an AT unit and equals 250 monetary units; finally,
rangePrices is defined by (18).
PricePerATlow = From(minATPrice)
To(minATPrice+ rangePrices) (15)
PricePerATmed = From(minATPrice+ rangePrices+ 1)
To(minATPrice+ 2(rangePrices))
(16)
PricePerAThigh = From(minATPrice+ 2(rangePrices) + 1)
To(maxATPrice)
(17)
rangePrices =
(maxATPrice−minATPrice)
3
(18)
Running Environment: The modifications that
have been made to SPECTRAD, do not change
the running considerations of the original model.
SPECTRAD has been developed in Java and runs on
top of REPAST Simphony, an agent-based modeling
platform which provides a running environment
appropriate for ACE models.
In [2], the market viability results obtained using
SPECTRAD were the output of testing various
scenarios given by the variation of the following
parameters:
• Number of Market Participants
• Distribution of spectrum users’ valuation level
• Available Spectrum
• Market Type
We have taken into account the same parameters
and their variations to test our non-perfect fungibil-
ity compliant version of SPECTRAD. The values of
these parameters are summarized in Table V. Note
that, in order to thoroughly analyze the effect of
non-perfect spectrum fungibility, we have started
with a scenario in which all spectrum users have
a low valuation of the spectrum. Following this,
all SUs should have a 700 MHz preferred center
frequency. We shall consider this scenario, as the
worst-case situation for non-perfect fungibility and
market liquidity.
9SPECTRAD Parameters
Number of Market
Participants numSLRs = {4, 5, 6, 10, 20, 50}
Distribution of Users’
Spectrum Valuation
All users have low spectrum valu-
ation and hence, high AT valuation
Available Spectrum numBBUs = R ∗ numSLRs
R = {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}
Market Type Band Manager Exchange-basedmarket
TABLE V
SPECTRAD RUNNING ENVIRONMENT PARAMETERS
B. Market Viability
In [2], Band Manager exchange-based markets’
viability is determined through the analysis of the
following parameters:
Probability of Empty Bid List
Represents the willingness of users to
obtain spectrum from the market. When
there is a significant number of empty bid
lists, this implies that the users are not
interested in acquiring spectrum from the
BM and thus this is an adverse condition
for market liquidity.
Probability of Demand Greater than Supply
When the demand is greater than the
supply, the cutoff price is derived from
the market activity and finally determined
by the highest bidders. Having markets
where the demand is not greater than
the supply implies that there is not a
significant interest in the market for
obtaining spectrum and thus, the cutoff
price will be the minimum established by
the BM.
Average Cutoff Price
This factor is closely related to the
probability of demand being greater than
the supply. We desire markets in which
the average cutoff price is determined
by the bidding activity of the SLRs, and
thus well above the minimum cutoff price
established by the BM.
Average Number of AT units per spectrum user
In a spectrum trading market, a desirable
outcome would portray SUs opting for
spectrum rather than AT units. In this
manner, we would expect users to keep
their AT units’ holdings below the average
number of ATs that they need to satisfy
their average traffic requirements.
Percentage of Assigned Bandwidth Units
This parameter is directly related to the
spectrum efficiency in the market. In
this manner, a desirable outcome is for
the majority of the BM spectrum assets
to be assigned at the end of the bid rounds.
Table VI shows the values that these parameters
should have in order to satisfy market liquidity.
It should be mentioned that the minimum cutoff
price established by the BM is 30 monetary units,
condition that justifies the fail value for the average
cutoff price criterion. Additionally, note that in the
case of perfect fungibility, the fail value for the
average number of ATs criterion differs. In perfect
circumstances we still shall consider the fail value
to be ≥ 10 as in [2].
We have evaluated the different test scenarios
according to these parameters and thus determined
the resulting viable markets, which are presented in
the following section.
Viability Criteria
Criteria PassValue
Fail
Value
Score
Pass/Fail
P1 - Bid List Empty < 1% ≥ 1% 1/-1
P2 - Demand Greater
than Supply ≥ 10% < 1% 1/-1
P3 - Cutoff Price N/A < 31 0/-1
P4 - Percentage of
Assigned BBUs ≥ 62% < 62% 1/-1
P5 - Number of ATs
per User N/A ≥ 3 0/-1
TABLE VI
VIABILITY CRITERIA AND MARKET SCORES
IV. RESULTS
This section presents the process we have fol-
lowed in order to determine our market viability
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scores, quantitative measures for the aforementioned
scores and the corresponding analysis of these re-
sults.
A. Methodology for determining Viability Scores
During our preliminary analysis, we performed
one hundred runs of 5000 time ticks of each of
the 30 different combinations of our parameters to
obtain the market viability results when incorporat-
ing the calculated capacity fungibility score in the
price limit. We proceeded to explore how sensitive
these viability results were to further decrease of the
fungibility score, and thus to lower limit prices. We
noted that the results we obtained when performing
20 runs of the model present a difference of ±0.06,
in the worst case, with respect to the results we ob-
tained with 100 runs of our model. This difference
does not have an impact on the final viability or
non-viability condition of a market. In addition, we
noticed that regardless of our changes in fungibility
considerations, from the perfect fungibility scenario
to harsh considerations, the scenarios corresponding
to R ≥ 15 never show viable markets. It is for
the two latter reasons that the results we present in
this section correspond to the 18 scenarios resulting
from the combination of the number of SLRs with
5 ≤ R ≤ 15, each of them tested in 20 runs of the
model. Thus, we were able to evaluate many more
model environments in the available time.
For obtaining the final results, in every run, we
recorded the values corresponding to the viability
criteria during the last 2000 time ticks.2 We ob-
tained an average per run prior to an aggregate
average of the 20 model runs for each parameter.
Taking into account the pass/fail values for each
viability criterion presented in Table VI, we have
further determined a set of conditions that account
for market liquidity under non-perfect fungibility
circumstances.
In our sensitivity analysis results, we present the
results under four different fungibility considera-
tions:
• Perfect Fungibility
• Fungibility Score = 0.3448
• Fungibility Score = 0.25
• Fungibility Score = 0.15
2The first 3000 time ticks are considered a training or warm-up
period in the original model and are disregarded for the final score
calculations.
The first fungibility score corresponds to the
capacity probabilistic score (at fixed distance) cal-
culated in the first section of this paper. Consid-
ering only this value to portray our fungibility
considerations would be an optimistic approach. By
so doing, we would infer that the difference in
the capacity we would achieve with an alternate
frequency is the only concern of the SLR. However,
realistically, there are a myriad of factors related
to opting for a new frequency. For instance, the
radio equipment must be adapted to comply with
transmission requirements and there is a learning
curve associated with using the new frequency
effectively. For consumer facing services (such as
mobile telephone services), new handsets have to be
sourced, tested and marketed. All these constraints
should be reflected in the price the user is willing
to pay for the available frequency. To reflect these
factors in our analysis, we have tested the two lower
fungibility values: 0.25 and 0.15.
B. Quantitative Results
After merging all the considerations above in our
version of the SPECTRAD model, we can present
in figure 4 the resulting market viability scores for
every scenario we have tested. It is worth noting that
a market will be considered viable when its score
is greater than 0.
To complement the results presented in figure 4,
tables VII, VIII, IX and X show the tested scenarios
with the corresponding score for every viability
criterion, in addition to the final market score.
Fungibility Score equal to Capacity Probabilistic Score
NumSUs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
6 30 5 1 0 0 1 -1 1
10 50 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
20 100 5 1 1 0 1 0 3
50 250 5 1 1 0 1 0 3
5 50 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
6 60 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
10 100 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
20 200 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
50 500 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
TABLE VII
MARKET SCORE RESULTS FOR THE PERFECT FUNGIBILITY
SCENARIO
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Fig. 4: Market viability scores for different levels of spectrum fungibility.
Fungibility Score equal to Capacity Probabilistic Score
NumSUs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
10 50 5 1 0 0 1 -1 1
20 100 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
50 250 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
5 50 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
6 60 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
10 100 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
20 200 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
50 500 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
TABLE VIII
MARKET VIABILITY SCORES OBTAINED FOR CAPACITY
PROBABILISTIC FUNGIBILITY SCORE
C. Analysis
From the results presented in figure 4, we find
market liquidity in all our fungibility scenarios when
5 ≤ R ≤ 10. Nevertheless, we do observe some
changes as the level of fungibility decreases.
When considering a perfect fungibility environ-
ment, with R = 5, we find market viability when
6 ≤ numSUS ≤ 50. When R = 10, markets begin
to be liquid when numSUs ≥ 5. This accounts for
a total of 9 viable markets under perfect fungibility
conditions when all users have a low valuation
of spectrum. As we incorporate our non-perfect
fungibility measures, we start losing viable mar-
kets. When considering our capacity probabilistic
Fungibility Score equal to Capacity Probabilistic Score
NumSUs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
10 50 5 1 0 0 1 -1 1
20 100 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
50 250 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
6 60 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
10 100 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
20 200 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
50 500 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
TABLE IX
MARKET VIABILITY SCORE OBTAINED WHEN THE FUNGIBILITY
SCORE IS 0.25
Fungibility Score equal to Capacity Probabilistic Score
NumSUs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
20 100 5 1 1 -1 1 -1 1
50 250 5 1 1 -1 1 -1 1
6 60 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
10 100 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
20 200 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
50 500 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
TABLE X
MARKET VIABILITY SCORES OBTAINED WHEN THE FUNGIBILITY
SCORE IS 0.15
fungibility score (0.3448), when R = 5, market
viability starts when numSUs ≥ 10. Nonetheless,
for R = 10, the viability conditions are the same as
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those of the perfect fungibility scenario. Under these
fungibility circumstances we have 8 viable markets.
When we lower the fungibility score to 0.25,
we now have 7 viable markets as market viability
conditions remain for R = 5 and for R = 10
viability now starts when numSUs ≥ 6.
In the scenario which considers our final and lowest
fungibility score, we loose one more market, for a
total of 6 viable markets. In this case, we maintain
the same number of viable markets when R = 10
as in the last scenario; however, for R = 5 viability
starts only when numSUS ≥ 20.
The results included in tables VII to X,
permit us to additionally determine the following
characteristics associated with market viability:
• All the resulting viable markets have a positive
score for the probability of empty bid list
criterion. This implies that every successful
market has less than 1% probability of having
an empty bid list, which as well represents that
users have a high willingness for acquiring
spectrum.
• Successful markets have a significant
probability of the demand being greater
than the supply. The worst case accounts for a
probability between 1% and 10%.
• In our two first fungibility considerations,
we can observe that the average value of the
cutoff price is above our threshold which gives
a score of 0 for this factor. The two following
scenarios, where the fungibility score falls
to 0.25 and 0.15, show situations in which
the price goes below the “pass” threshold.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this value
is always slightly above the minimum cutoff
price as there are always markets where the
demand is greater than the supply.
• All the viable markets have a high percentage
of spectrum assignment, which shall
correspond to at least 62% of the BM
spectrum holdings.
• In the case of the average number of AT units
per spectrum user, we observe negative values
for this condition only when R = 5. As R raises
to 10, which further corresponds to a better
level of spectrum supply, the average user will
hold less than 3 AT units.
As it can be observed from our results, the num-
ber of viable markets is proportional to the impact
of the fungibility scores in the limit prices. Besides
reducing the number of viable markets, from figure
4 we can also observe that the markets that remain
liquid experience decrease in their viability score.
To finalize our evaluation process, we can relate
our current results to those presented in [2]. In
that work different spectrum valuation levels were
explored, all of them including a combination of
low, medium and high spectrum valuation users.
Under these circumstances, on average, we have
10 viable markets and we can see that viability is
achieved when 5 ≤ R ≤ 15. When using the origi-
nal model for analyzing market viability when only
low valuation users are present, and after adapting
the viability criteria to the running conditions, we
already experience decrease in the viability results.
We now will have viable markets when 5 ≤ R ≤ 10
for a total of 9 viable markets. We shall remember,
still, that for the perfect fungibility environment
with only low spectrum valuation users studied in
this work, we have not made any modifications
to the basis and logic of the model and analysis
presented in [2].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
This work presents an initial approach for merg-
ing non-fungibility notions with spectrum trading
markets. Our first consideration has been to directly
apply our fungibility scores to the spectrum pricing
scheme in an spectrum trading environment, such
as SPECTRAD. The results obtained depict propor-
tionality between the level of fungibility and the
number of resulting viable markets, fact that in a
general sense goes along the lines of intuition. What
was not expected was that the markets remained
fairly robust even in more drastic operational con-
ditions. The markets that were “lost” were ones
when spectrum was relatively scarce with respect
to demand and where the number of participants
was small. Unfortunately, this is consistent with
the present mobile carrier environment in most
localities, so we do not hold it likely that this form
of spectrum market would emerge in practice.
As previously mentioned, this has been an initial
approach and our first step towards making a fun-
13
gibility impact analysis. Further work shall contem-
plate new market structures such as the analysis of
an exchange-based market without a band manager
functionality, in which we can determine additional
conditions that may have a significant impact in the
viability of a spectrum trading environment. Fur-
thermore, we shall merge additional fungibility con-
siderations that could exploit the multi-dimensional
spectrum characteristics and determine more de-
tailed conditions and consequences of fungibility
limitations.
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